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I study the behaviour of the CDS-bond basis - the difference between the CDS 
and the bond spread - for a sample of investment-graded US firms. I document 
that, since the onset of the 2007/08 financial crisis it has become persistently 
negative, and I investigate the role played by the cost of trading the basis and 
its underlying risks. To exploit the negative basis an arbitrageur must finance 
the purchase of the underlying bond and buy protection. The idea is that, during 
the crisis, because of the funding liquidity shortage and the increased risk in 
the financial sector, which exposes protection buyers to counter-party risk, the 
negative basis trade is risky. In fact, I find that basis dynamics is driven by 
economic variables that are proxies for funding liquidity (cost of capital and 
hair cuts), credit markets liquidity and risk in the inter-bank lending market 
such as the Libor-OIS spread, the VIX, bid-asks spreads and the OIS-T-Bill 
spread. Results support the evidence that during stress times asset prices depart 
form frictionless ideals due to funding liquidity risk faced by financial 
intermediaries and investors; hence, deviations from parity do not imply 
presence of arbitrage opportunities. 
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 1 Introduction
The CDS-bond basis is dened as the dierence between the CDS and the bond spread, with
equal maturity, written on the same entity. Whenever this dierence is large, it is attractive to
implement a basis trade, buying (selling) credit risk in the cash market and selling (buying) it in
the derivative market if the basis is negative (positive), in order to prot from price discrepancies.
In early 2009, Boaz Weinstein, a trader and co-head of credit trading at Deutsche Bank was down
$1bn, Ken Grin of Citadel was down 50% and John Thain of Merril was said to be down by more
than $10bn. The big part of these losses is due to the so called "negative basis trade".
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, study the behavior of the basis during the 2007/08
nancial crisis. Second, investigate why investors have lost money, on basis trades, during that
period. I document that, during the crisis, the average basis on corporate entities has become
strongly and persistently negative. Such a situation has never been reported in earlier studies. For
example, Blanco et. al. (2005), nd that the basis is usually positive and narrow and that short-
term deviations are due to CDS spreads leading bond spreads in the price discovery process. If two
markets price credit risk equally then their prices should be the same in levels and should move
together. Instead, I nd that, during the crisis, CDS and bond spreads have deviated form the
parity condition. Implications have been dramatic for negative CDS-bond basis traders who where
operating on the belief that bases deviation where risk-free and short-lived arbitrage opportunities.
The followings are among the possible explanations of the deviation from parity. First, a
dramatic increase of funding costs aects the CDS' pricing by no-arbitrage and reduces the basis
trading return for arbitrageurs. Second, when the basis has shifted into negative territory, basis
traders where reporting mark-to-market losses. Due to liquidity shortage (funding liquidity risk)
basis traders have been forced to de-leverage, closing their positions, driving the basis even more
negative and realizing large losses. Third, protection sellers' (dealers) counter-party risk lowers
CDS spreads. Fourth, investors facing redemptions tend to cut their most liquid position which
include corporate bonds, and at the same time a higher funding cost makes it more expensive, for
dealers, to provide liquidity in the bond market driving bond spreads larger. All this things may
play a role in explaining the negative basis and are all related to funding liquidity conditions in the
nancial market.
2The relation between bond yields and CDS is a close-to-arbitrage one that holds when markets
are relatively liquid, i.e., when bid-ask spreads are narrow, market participants are able easily to
nd funding for purchases of bonds (leverage or repo) and the inter-bank-lending market is well
functioning. Clearly, these conditions were much better approximated by the period leading up to
the crisis than the period since the onset of the crisis in the summer of 2007.
If two nancial variables are cointagrated (Engle and Granger (1987)) they share the same
stochastic trend and are expected to drift not to far apart. The idea is that they will recover from
deviations to their equilibrium relation. If this is not the case, the model describing the equilibrium
relation should include the costs and risk factors that explain the deviation. I investigate the role
played by economic variables that may capture cost and risk factors of implementing the negative
basis trade, such as the Libor-OIS spread, the OIS-Tbill spread, the VIX and the bid-ask spread
on CDS contracts, and show that, in the period during the crisis, these are the main drivers of the
basis dynamics. The Libor-OIS spread captures all together (i) the funding cost and the funding
liquidity risk faced by investors, (ii) counter-party risk implicit into CDS spreads and (iii) corporate
bond market liquidity deterioration (Brunnermeier 2009). The OIS-Tbill spread is a measure of
the "Flight to quality" phenomenon. The VIX is a measure of liquidity and risk premia in nancial
markets and is supposed to capture the cost of funding the negative basis trade given by the haircut
and the margin requirement applied on the repo-transaction through which the bond is nanced.
According to Brunnermeier (2009) and Garleanu and Pedersen (2009), haircuts and margins act as
market frictions that aects the implementation of price-correcting trades and give raise to price
gaps between securities with identical cash-
ows but dierent margin requirements. Finally, the
bid-ask spread on CDS contracts is a measure of liquidity conditions in credit markets.
From the beginning of August 2007, when the crisis started, all these variables experienced a
dramatic shift from their historic trends, i.e. they increased suddenly and become more volatile.
Bond spreads have become larger than CDS spreads, and the basis has gone into negative territory.
I nd that the basis dynamics is driven by the economic variables, described above, that are proxies
for liquidity conditions and risk in the inter-bank lending market. The idea that during stress times
asset prices depart materially farther from frictionless ideals, i.e. from their fundamentals. The
deviation from parity does not imply the presence and persistence of arbitrage opportunities, in
fact the basis trading is faceing liquidity and counter-party risk, hence it is not risk-free.
3This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a short review of the related literature
and highlights the contribution. Section 3 discusses the conceptual framework that underlines the
parity relationship between the CDS and the bond spread. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
presents the empirical analysis: methodology and results. Final remarks are oered in section 6.
2 Review of the related literature
This paper is in line with previous studies on the dynamic relation between CDS and bond
spreads, such as Blanco et.al. (2005) and Norden et.al. (2004) and De Wit (2006), but it covers
a dierent time period, which goes from 1/3/2005 to 11/19/20091. The focus is on the impact of
the 2007/08 nancial crisis and on how common factors explain a persistent deviation from parity.
Using a sample of investment-graded rms, Blanco et.al. (2005) nd that the theoretical arbitrage
relationship linking credit spreads over the risk-free rate to CDS prices holds reasonably well on
average for most of the companies they considered (especially for US rms) when the risk-free rate
is proxied by the swap rate, though they may dier signicantly in the short-run. I nd similar
results for the period before July 2007, instead during the crisis CDS and bond spreads drift apart.
Blanco et.al. argue that CDS forms an upper bound for credit risk because of the "cheapest to
delivery option",2 while credit spread forms a lower bound because of repo costs. This implies that
in normal market conditions the CDS-basis is positive on average. Dierently, this paper shows
that during the crisis, the bond spread is an upper bound for the price of credit risk while the CDS
is a lower bound. Cash bonds are funded instrument their so spreads are adversely aected by the
cost of funding that drives yields larger, while CDS spreads, which are unfunded, are aected by
counter-party risk being sold at discount.
Other studies such as Zhu (2004), Norden et.al. (2004) and De Wit (2006) reach similar con-
clusions of Blanco et.al. (2005). Concerning relationship between CDS and bond spreads, Blanco
et.al. (2005) detect cointegration for 27 of 33 rms; Zhu (2004) detects cointegration for 15 out of
24 rms; Norden et.al. (2004) detect cointegration of spreads for 36 out of 58, and De Wit (2006)
detects cointegration for 88 of 144 rms. In general, for the US market there is cointergation in
1For example Blanco et.al. (2005) data run from 2 January 2001 through 20 June 2002. De Wit (2006) data run
from January 2004 to December 2006
2In practice the protection buyer will deliver the cheapest-to-deliver bond from the delivery basket. This option
has a positive value, for this reason protection providers will quote higher CDS premiums.
475% of the cases. Longsta et.al. (2005) study the default and non-default component of credit
spreads using CDS information and nd that both specic (to the bond) liquidity and overall (mar-
ket) liquidity have an impact on the non-default component. The determinants of CDS and bond
spreads have been studied by Collin-Dufresene et.al. (2001), Elton et.al. (2001) and also others
who nd that similar factors behind changes in CDS premium and the bond spread.
This paper is also related to the empirical literature on arbitrage, cointegration (Engle and
Granger (1987)) and market eciency. Cointegration is used extensively to study the link between
spot and futures markets. Brenner and Kroner (1995) used a no-arbitrage cost of carry asset pricing
model to explain why some markets are expected to be cointegrated while others are not. The idea
is that cointegration depends critically on the time-series dynamics of the cost of carry. They
showed that spot and future prices are cointegrated, in an ecient market, if the cost of carry is
stationary, if it is not, the cointegrating relation should include the stock price, the future price and
the cost of carry the arbitrage too. Following this line, persistent price discrepancies are explained
by the cost of carrying the arbitrage trade.
I use the same idea to show that, during the crisis, the CDS and the bond spread wonder apart
because of the explosion of the cost and the risk of trading the basis.To my knowledge, no empirical
study has yet investigated the issue of price discrepancies in the market for credit risk during the
crisis. I provide such an examination.
3 The CDS-bond basis
3.1 The connection between CDS and bond spreads: a "close-to-arbitrage"
relation
CDS are the most liquid of the credit derivatives currently traded and form the basic building
blocks for more complex structured credit products. They can be used to transfer credit risk from
the investor exposed to the risk (the protection buyer) to an investor willing to assume that risk (the
protection seller). A CDS is a bilateral contract where one counterparty buys default protection
with respect to a reference credit event. This contract terminates at maturity or default, whichever
comes rst. In the event of a loss the protection buyer is compensated with the dierence between
the par value of the bond or loan and its market value after default. The protection seller, collects
5a periodic fee, and prots if the credit risk of the reference entity remains stable or improves
while the swap is outstanding. CDS are almost exclusively traded over-the-counter. There are
diverse participant in this market: banks, brokerage rms, insurance companies, pension funds,
hedge funds and asset managers. The premium paid is quoted in basis points, per annum, of the
contract's notional value; this is what we call CDS spread.
How does the pricing by arbitrage of a CDS work? Let's consider the most simple situation
in which: the CDS counterparties are default free, the contingent payment amount specied in
the contract is the dierence 100   Y () between the face value and the market value Y () of the
underlying note issued by C at credit event time  and the underlying note is a 
oating-rate note.
The underlying 
oating-rate note is initially issued at par, it is costless to short it and there are
no transaction costs. The termination payment, given a credit event, is made at the immediately
following coupon date of the underlying note. The contract is settled, if terminated by the credit
event by physical delivery of the underlying note in exchange for cash in the amount of its face
value. Under these assumptions the CDS price may be obtained by arbitrage. A synthetic (long)
CDS can be created shorting a risky 
oating-rate note for an initial cash receivable of 100 and
buying a par default-free 
oating-rate note for the same amount. This portfolio has to be held
till maturity or default whichever comes rst. One pays coupons on the risky bond and receives
the coupons on the default free one. The dierence between these two quantities is the spread S
of the par note issued by C over the default-free 
oating rate. If default happens before maturity
the value of the portfolio is the dierence 100   Y () between the market value of the default-free

oating rate note and the market value of the note issued by C. In order to have no arbitrage the
net constant annuity U, which is the CDS spread, has to be xed such that U=S. When ever U and
S dier substantially arbitrageurs' trading activities arbitrage away prices discrepancies, driving
prices to their no-arbitrage relation.
What described above works in a theoretical setting, in practice CDS contracts are traded
in OTC markets and provided by dealers. Dealers that sell a CDS (buy credit risk) hedge their
position (buying protection) short-selling the risky bond that they obtain via repo. Instead, when
they buy a CDS (sell credit risk) they hedge (selling protection) buying the risky bond that they
nance paying a funding rate. When a particular bond is dicult to obtain as a collateral the
associated repo rate may be below the risk-free rate rising the cost of shorting. If repos are special
6(lower than the risk free) it becomes more costly, for the dealer, to provide a CDS short-selling the
risky bond. As a consequence the CDS spread is
U(ask) = Spread + (RiskFree   Repo) (1)
Dierently, the nancing rate is generally above the risk-free, this makes it more costly for the
dealer to buy CDS from customers. So
U(bid) = Spread   (FinancingRate   RiskFree) (2)
Hence, if the repos are special the basis may be persistently positive, and if the funding cost is
relevant, the basis is persistently negative.
The pricing relation discussed is a rst order approximation, because bonds may default at any
time, not just at coupon dates; moreover bonds have generally xed, not 
oating, coupons hence
they might trade away from par3. In general, even though cash 
ows on a long default-free bond
and a short defaultable bond are not precisely those on a CDS, it's very close. Therefore, in a
situation in which market frictions are negligible, the CDS is expected to be strictly connected the
bond spread irrespective of how the bond yield is related to actual default intensity.
3.2 Why is the basis negative during the crisis?
How do market frictions and various risk factors in
uence the basis trade which makes the
parity relation, between the CDS and the bond spread, hold? The main simple reason why the
basis has deviated from zero is that CDS, which are derivatives contracts, and bonds, which are
cash instruments, are exposed to dierent risk factors.
In principle, taking credit risk purchasing a corporate bond or shorting a CDS, on a reference
entity, is equivalent. The point is that corporate bonds and CDS are not substitutes. Bond prices
are exposed to: interest rate risk, default risk, funding risk and market liquidity risk, while CDS
3The approximation depends on how much the bond is away from par, on the coupon level, on the shape of
the term structure of risk-free interest rates and on the shape of CDS curve. Departures from par and from a 
at
shape of the interest rate term structure deteriorate the approximation. For a detailed examination of these issues
see Fontana (2009).
7spreads are aected, mostly, by default risk and the related risk premia and counter-party risk.
Funding risk is due to the fact that bonds are cash instruments, hence the return on the investment
depends on the cost of funding, while liquidity risk to the fact that deterioration of liquidity in the
corporate bond market may have an adverse impact on bond prices, hence on the cost of nancing
the purchase of the bond itself via a reverse-repo.
Being CDS unfunded derivatives contracts instead there is an issue of counter-party risk, since
the protection seller may not be able to compensate the buyer, in the event of default of the
underlying name. The connection between bond yields and CDS is a "close to arbitrage" relation
that is expected to hold when, markets are relatively liquid, i.e. bid-ask spreads are relatively narrow
and market participants are able to easily to nd funding for purchases of bonds, moreover dealers
who provide protection are not risky. Clearly these conditions where much better approximated by
the period leading up to the crisis than the period since the onset of the crisis in the summer of
2007.
If a bond is trading more cheaply than the CDS an arbitrageur may prot implementing a
negative basis trade in two ways. A rst way is with a long run focus ("arbitrage-negative-basis-
trade"). He buys the bond, buys protection, swaps the libor with a swap rate of the maturity of the
bond (to hedge interest rate risk) and keeps this position till maturity to gain a "risk-free" yield.
This strategy is "risk-free" in the sense that the investor does not care if the underlying name
defaults, since what he looses on the bond he makes back from the short risk position in the CDS.
A second way is with a short run focus (speculation). A trader may speculate on the variation of
the basis in a short leg of time implementing a convergence trade type strategy. When the basis
is negative he buys the bond, buys protection and hedges interest rate risk, as soon as the basis
narrows he closes the position selling the bond and selling the CDS. This strategy is based on the
belief that the basis is going to narrow whenever it is there.
The negative basis trade is not a perfect hedge, in fact it carries risks such as funding risk,
mark-to-market loss risk4 and counter-party risk5. Also, there is an issue of "coupon risk" and an
issue of "recovery risk" 6. I believe there are a number of possible reasons of why the behavior of
4Whenever traders leverage up their position they bear the risk they maybe forced to de-levarege in case of large
market losses, or in case of an exogenous reason.
5Among other things, CDS buyers are often buying wrong way exposure; in fact, positive correlation between
bond and counter-party default implies discount to the CDS premium.
6As highlighted in Fontana (2009) the basis trade is not a risk-free trade because, since default may happen at
8the CDS-bond basis may have deviated from zero during the 2007/08 nancial crisis and they are
all related to the fact that the negative basis trade, as pointed above, is not a perfect hedge.
First, a dramatic increase of cost of nancing has aected dealers' CDS pricing. The lower
bound on a dealers bid price for protection is provided by the net cost of nancing the purchase
of the underlying cash bond7. Under normal conditions this cost approximates the bond spread
and, in turn, the CDS spread. However, when the cost of nancing increases the net cost falls
and with it the CDS spread below which it is worthwhile for the dealer to bid for protection while
hedging in the cash market. Lowering the bid price for protection also lowers the mid-price and,
therefore, standard measures of the basis. The cost of nancing aects investors trading activities
in a similar way. In order to exploit a negative basis an investor must nance the purchase of the
bond and buy protection. During the crisis the cost of nancing, if indeed nancing is available, has
increased substantially thus reducing or eliminating the return to arbitrageurs. The cost of funding
a negative basis trade is also given by the hair cut applied on the repo-transaction through which
the bond is nanced. Risk in nancial markets has an adverse impact on the bond s' liquidity and
on the value of the bond as a collateral and contributes to and increase of haircuts, i.e. an increase
of the cost of funding.
Second, bond market liquidity deterioration. Investors, facing redemption and imposed reduc-
tion of the leverage, tend to cut their most liquid position which include corporate bonds, and to
cut positions on basis trades driving the basis even more into negative territory. An increase in
funding costs makes it also more expensive for dealers to hold corporate bonds into inventory and
therefore lowers the liquidity of the market. It is possible that this lower liquidity is re
ected in
higher spreads and, if so, this would also contribute to a reduction of the basis.
Third, protection sellers' counter-party risk lowers CDS spreads. Selling protection may be
achieved both via the CDS market and by buying cash bonds, but an important dierence between
the two is that in buying a bond the protection provided is funded, i.e., in the event of default the
buyer of a bond simply accepts an amount (the recovery amount) that is lower than the nominal
amount. Thus the provision of protection in this case does not depend on the creditworthiness of the
bondholder. On the other hand the value of protection provided by a seller of protection via CDS
any time, the coupon is not hedged. Also when the bond is away from par there is a risk of recovery, since the amount
invested in the purchase of the corporate bond is likely to be over or under-hedged.
7This refers to the pricing equation (2).
9depends entirely on the sellers creditworthiness. Most protection sellers are nancial institutions
and the credit worthiness of many of these has clearly deteriorated markedly through the crisis.
For example, A.I.G. and the monoline insurers, who were signicant net sellers of protection, have
suered severe nancial distress and, in the case of some monolines, failure. Sellers of protection
are also exposed too, to some extent, to counterparty risk since they face mark-to-market losses in
the event of the failure of the buyer.
4 Data
4.1 Data description
The analysis is conducted on a sample of 37 U.S. rms, that are listed on Table 1 with indication
of sector and rating.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Table 2 shows that 8 dierent sectors are well represented, but the majority of reference entities
carry rating A and BBB. Data run from January 3, 2005 trough April 1, 2009, more than one
semester after the "Lehman crash".
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
CDS's are over the counter instruments traded mainly in New York and London. Indicative
bid-ask quotes are provided by Thomson Financial Datastream. Prices hold at market closure
at 5 p.m., are for a notional value of $10 million and are based on ISDA benchmark contracts
for physical settlement. All CDS are of ve years maturity, which is the most liquid one. Also
corporate bonds are traded mainly over-the-counter in the US. Bond spreads over the swap rates
are provided by Thomson Financial Datastream. These data are also at the close of the market at
5.50 p.m Eastern time, which is slightly later than the CDS market.
In order to match CDS's with bond spreads, I create a synthetic constant 5 years maturity
bond spread. At every point in time in the sample, for each entity with suitable CDS data, I
10search for a bond with less than ve years left to maturity, and another bond with more than ve
years to maturity. By linearly interpolating these spreads I approximate a ve-year to maturity
bond spread. When I have the choice I select the most liquid and most close to par bond. Only
senior, straight bonds are used. Floating-rate notes and bonds that have embedded options, step-up
coupons, or any special feature that would result in dierential pricing, are not considered 8.
The bond spread is the dierence between the bond yield and the risk-free rate. One possibility
is to calculate the bond spread over US Treasuries yields. However, government bonds are no longer
an ideal proxy for the unobservable risk-free rate. Taxation treatment, repo specials, legal constraint
among others, make goverment bond yields articially low for this purpose. As an alternative proxy
for the risk-free rate is interest rate swap. Previous empirical studies on CDS, such as Houweling
et.al (2003) and Blanco et.al (2005) have used swap rates as risk-free benchmarks. Swaps, being
synthetic, are available in virtually unlimited quantities so that liquidity is not an issue, and they
have the further advantage of being quoted on a constant maturity basis. However, swaps contain
a risk premium because the 
oating leg is indexed to LIBOR, which is a default-risky interest rate
and the presence of counter-party risk. Most importantly, investors do CDS-bond basis arbitrage
using the swap rate as risk free rates.
CDS bid-ask spreads are provided by datastream. Time series data for the Libor curve and
other variables used in the empirical analysis such as the T-Bill rate and the OIS (Overnight In-
dexed Swap) are also provided by the Federal Reserve. The VIX, i.e the implied volatility of S&P
500 index options, is downloaded from Datastream Thomson Financial.
4.2 The basis and the relevant economic variables: descriptive statistics
During the 2007/08 nancial crisis the CDS-bond basis is persistently negative, i.e. bond spreads
are on average larger than CDS spreads. 9 This is a signal that special factors are at work.
Figure 1 shows the time-series dynamics of then CDS, the bond spreads and the bases, for
corporate entities, aggregated by rating group, separately for industrials and nancials. Financials
8The idea is to neutralize as much as possible technical factors such as contractual specications that aect the
CDS-bond basis.
9Blanco et at (2005) report that the cross-sectional mean of the times series average of the CDS-bond bases, for
a sample of 33 US rms, is + 6 basis points when using the swap rate as the reference rate, for AAA-AA, 0.5 bps for
A and 14 bps for BBB; in general 3 bps. These result are in line with ours in the period before crisis.
11entities are at the core of the crisis and default risk is much higher than for industrials, hence the
CDS, the bond spread and the basis series are quite dierent. Spreads represent the creditworthiness
and the risk of default of the underlying names and they are larger for lower ratings. Before the
crisis, CDS and bond spreads where very low and the dierence between them was neligeble. When
the crisis started, around the beginning of August 2007, both CDS and bond spreads increased, but
the basis has become negative. From September 15, 2008, when Lehman crashed, spreads exploded
and the basis has become even more negative.
Table 3 shows the average and the median CDS-bond basis, across ratings, separately for the
nancial and the industrial sector, for three dierent periods: January 2005 to August 2007 is the
pre-crisis period (Period 1), August 2007 to August 2008 is the pre-Lehmann crash period (Period
2) and August 2008 to March 2009 (Period 3) is the crisis period after Lehman collapsed. Before the
crisis, there is evidence of the so called basis smile i.e. the average basis for the A rating category
is the lowest, -4.9 bps.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
For AAA rating the average basis is positive, 12 bps, also because CDS are 
oored at zero, while
bond spreads for highly rated entities are very low. For the BBB category, instead the average basis
is 3.8 bps, the "Cheapest to Delivery option" increases the CDS premium with respect to the bond
spread. In the second period, the basis is negative (on average -17.2 bps), except for the AAA
rating. When Lehman crashed, on the 15th of September, the overall average basis went down
dramatically to -147.5 bps.10 Notice that for lower rated entities, the negative bases are larger
pointing to the fact that economic and risk factors, that are at work, have dierent impacts across-
ratings groups (collateral quality hypothesis). Also, for the nancial sector spreads are generally
higher, and the basis is more negative; in fact the crisis has originated from the nancial sector.
Next, I discuss the variables used for explaining the CDS-bond basis and motivate their role.
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the 3 month Libor minus the Overnight Indexed swap rate
(Lib-OIS spread), and the dynamics of the dierence between the OIS and the 3 month Treasury
10The average and the median are pretty much the same meaning the distribution is centered.
12bill rate (OIS-Tbill spread). Figure 3 shows the VIX dynamics. VIX is the symbol for the Chicago
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500
index options. It is a measure of risk premia in nancial markets. In this sense, a high value
corresponds to a more volatile market. Figure 4 shows the dynamics of CDS's bid-ask spreads
separately for industrial and for nancials. What is the role played by the Libor-OIS spread, the
OIS-Tbill spread, the VIX and the bid-ask spreads in CDS markets in our empirical analysis?
The Libor-OIS spread is an indicator of both the counter-party risk and the funding
liquidity risk implicit in a negative basis trade11. The 3 month Libor is the rate at which banks
declare they are willing to lend to each other unsecured. The OIS is the rate on a derivative
contract on the overnight rate. In the US, the overnight rate is the eective federal funds rate
and is considered risk-free. Changes in the Libor-OIS spread re
ect both changes in the credit risk
premium and changes in liquidity premium. The Libor-OIS spread is a measure of the risk in the
inter-bank-lending-market because it re
ects what banks believe is the risk of default associated
with lending to other banks. When it increases, that means that lenders believe the risk of default
on interbank loans is higher. As described in section 3.2, CDS providers are big banks and counter-
party risk might be priced in CDS contracts.
From an economic point of view, funds are valued at the rate they could be invested in the
money market; in general it is Libor plus a spread. So the funding cost to implement the negative
basis arbitrage refers to the spread over the Libor rate. The problem is that during periods of
nancial turmoil the Libor itself dramatically increases with respect to the rate on government
bonds, and often funding is even not available.
The funding cost hence refers not only to higher rates, but also to the value of the bond as
a collateral. To earn an arbitrage prot an investor must use capital, and during a funding crisis
capital is required to earn excess returns for constrained investors: price discrepancies between
cash bonds and CDS are consistent with the margin-based asset pricing model by Garleanu and
Pedersen (2009). "Typically, informed traders, such as dealers, hedge funds, or investment banks,
use the purchased bonds as collateral and borrow (short term) against it, but they cannot borrow
the entire price. The dierence between the bond's price and collateral value, the margin, must be
11Counter-party risk refers to the risk that the protection buyer is not compensated, in case of default of the
underlying bond, by the dealer providing the CDS contract.
13nanced by the traders own capital. An increase in margins or haircuts requires investors to use
more of their own capital and forces traders to de-leverage their positions" Brunnermaier (2008).
The idea is that the value of the bond and the margin requirements are crucial in order to determine
the cost of the capital used in order to implement the negative basis trade and represent a friction
that aects the implementation of price-correcting trades, i.e. margin requirements justify the
price discrepancies between bonds, which are funded instruments and CDS which are unfunded
instruments and can be bought without the use of capital. The VIX is supposed to capture, in
addition to the time-dynamics of the risk premium on risky investments, the funding cost due to
the deterioration of bond' s value as a collateral in the negative basis trade. In addition, risk in
nancial markets has an adverse impact on the bond s' liquidity, hence on the value of the bond
as a collateral and contributes to increase haircuts further.
The OIS-Tbill spread is the spread between the Overnight Indexed Swap and the short term
3 month Treasury bill. Treasuries are the safest collateral and are particularly valuable in times
of crisis. The OIS-Tbill spread dynamics captures the "
ight to quality" phenomenon, and the
corporate bond market liquidity deterioration. Fund managers prefer to switch to safe investments,
which makes holding Treasury bonds more attractive and lowers the Treasury bond rate (Brun-
nermaier 2009) with respect to the OIS. Graphically these facts show up as spikes of the series.
Liquidity deterioration in the corporate bond market drives yields high irrespective of the default
intensity.
The bid-ask spread of CDS is a measure of liquidity of the CDS market. An increase of the
bid-ask spread would re
ect a deterioration of liquidity also in the corresponding bond market. A
situation in which bonds and CDS values are uncertain because of market liquidity risk makes the
basis trade more risky.
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 show that from the beginning of August 2007, when the crisis started, all
variables experienced a dramatic shift from their historic trends. CDS, bond spreads, the Libor-
OIS spread, the OIS-Tbill spread, the VIX and CDS's bid-ask spreads increased suddenly and have
become more volatile, while the basis has deviated from zero and has shifted dramatically into
negative territory.
INSERT FIGURES 1, 2, 3 AND 4 HERE
145 Empirical analysis
5.1 The lead-leg relationship between CDS and bond spreads
The analysis of the relationship and the adjustment process between CDS and bond spreads, in
the period that goes from January 2005 to April 2009, is conducted on 4 series given by the averages
of CDS and bond spreads by rating groups (AA, A and BBB Industrials and AA Financials)12.
The focus is on averages of spreads within rating groups because the focus is on the common factors
that drive the basis.13 Data consist of weekly observations.14
The existence of a cointegration relationship between the levels of two I(1) variables 15 means
that a linear combination of the variables is stationary. Cointegrated variables move together in
the long run, but may deviate from each other in the short run, which means they follow an
adjustment process towards the no-arbitrage condition. A model that considers this adjustment
process is the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). Cointegration analysis is carried out in the
framework proposed by Johansen (1988, 1991). This test is essentially a multivariate Dikey-Fuller
test that determines the number of cointegrating equations, or cointagrating rank, by calculating
the likelihood ratio statistics for each added cointegration equation in a sequence of nested models.16
The Vector Error Correction Model is specied as follows:






1jBSt j + 1t (3)






2jBSt j + 2t (4)
Zt 1 = CDSt 1   0   1BSt 1 (5)
Equation (3) and (4) express the short term dynamics of CDS and bond spread changes, while
Zt 1 is the error correction term given by the long run equation (5), that describes deviations of
CDS and bond spreads from their no-arbitrage relation. The model is specied with the optimal
12I do not implement the analysis on the industrials AAA rating group because of the lack of data.
13I have conducted the analysis on single entities and results are in line with results on averages within rating
groups.
14I have conducted the analysis on daily data and results are in line with those on weekly data.
15I(1) refers to non-stationarity given by the presence of a unit root.
16If the test does not reject the hypothesis that the number of cointerating vectors in none, the series are not
cointegrated. If it can not reject the hypothesis of at most, one cointegrating vector, there is one cointegrating vector
and the series are cointagrated.
15number of lags for each cointegrating relation.
If the cash bond market is contributing signicantly to the discovery of the price of credit risk,
then 1 will be negative and statistically signicant as the CDS market adjusts to incorporate
this information. Similarly, if the CDS market is an important venue for price discovery, then 2
will be positive and statistically signicant. If both coecients are signicant, then both markets
contribute to price discovery. The existence of cointegration means that at least one market has to
adjust by the Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger 1987).
As a rst step, I verify the supposed unit-root non-stationarity of the CDS and bond spread
series. A stationary series follows a process which has a constant mean, variance and auto-covariance
structure trough time. I apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller test to each of the 4 CDS and to each
of the 4 bond spread series, independently. Results are summarized in Table 4.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
As expected, the test does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all series in their
levels, but it does for all series in their rst dierences, i.e. all series are integrated once, I(1).
The results of the Johansen cointagration test are shown in Table 5.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
The trace statistics strongly rejects the absence of cointegration, but do not reject the exis-
tence of one cointegrating relationship. Table 6, reports the estimated coecients of the long-run
regressions.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
The coecients of CDS are restricted to unity, but the coecients of bond spreads are positive,
as expected, and well below unity, they are all between 0.37 and 0.4917. Also the constant term
is signicant and positive, for all rating groups. The parity relation does not hold, bond spreads
17A likelihood ratio (LR) test has been performed on the restriction of the coecient of bond spreads to unity.
The restrictions have been rejected. I do not report results for brevity.
16are larger than CDS and the basis dynamics is aected by non-transient factors, but since CDS
and bond spreads are cointegrated, i.e. they do not move in an unrelated way, the cash and the
derivative market for credit risk are informationally integrated.18 Table 7 reports results of the
short-run regressions.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
Cross-responses of CDS and bond spreads, when signicant they are generally positive, with
values less than unity meaning that a movement in one market is transmitted to the other in the
same direction, but with lower intensity. Also, for A and BBB industrials, the Adjusted R squared
(0.38 and 0.47) is slightly higher for equation describing bond spreads changes (0.21 and 0.24),
while for AA nancial and industrials the Adjusted R squared (0.21 and 0.30) is slightly higher for
the equation describing CDS changes.
The price discovery statistics are reported the bottom of Table 7. 1 is signicantly positive for
all rating groups, while 2 is signicantly negative for most of the groups, indicating that both the
CDS market and the bond market contribute signicantly to credit risk price discovery. Following
Blanco et.al., the method I use to investigate the mechanics of price discovery is a measure due
to Gonzalo and Granger (1995) dened as dened as the ratio: 2
2 1. This approach attributes
superior price discovery to the market that adjusts least to price movements in the other market.
The Granger-Gonzalo measure for AA industrials, AA nancials and A and BBB industrial is
respectively: 0.752, 0.787, 0.599 and 0.429, meaning that for all rating groups except for BBB price
discovery occurs mostly in the CDS market, eventhouh the value of GG is not much away from
0.5, meaning that new information 
ows into both markets, with a slight predominance of the CDS
market. Price discovery occurs in the market where informed investors trade at most. CDS are
unfunded instruments so they are the easiest way to trade credit risk. Because of their synthetic
nature they do not suer from the short-sales constraints seen in the cash-bond market, and buying
(or selling) relatively large quantities of credit risk is possible (Blanco et. al 2005). Hence, price
discovery is very much related to the market liquidity and does not give rise to systematic protable
opportunities.
18Concerning single relations, we nd cointegration for most of the names, 20 out of 37 (with a 10% level of
signicance); these results are in line with those of Blanco et.al. (2005), Norden et.al (2005) and Zhu (2004), who
nd, for US entities, that 2/3 of the relations are cointegrated.
175.2 Explaining the negative basis during the crisis
To study the risk factors that drive the negative basis during the crisis, I apply the Engel-
Granger two-step estimation approach using dummies for the crisis period. The idea is to account
for the structural break that has characterized the parity relation between CDS and bond spreads
and to study the dierent impact of the relevant economic variables, before vs. during the crisis.
I proceed as follows. First, I estimate the model using the variables in levels. The long run
relationship between bond spreads, CDS and the other variables, such as the Libor-OIS spread, the
OIS-TBill spread, the VIX and the bid-ask spread on CDS contracts, is the following19:
BSt = 0 + 1CDSt + 2LibOISt + 3OISTbillt + 4V IXt + 4BidAskt + ut (6)
If I reject the hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals then there is a long run relationship
between the variables (the variables are cointegrated). I check for stationarity of the residuals by
mean of the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test:




i^ ut 1 + t (7)
Rejection of  = 0 means that ut has no unit root, so that the variables in equation 6 are coin-
tagrated. In this case the OLS estimator is super consistent and there are no spurious regression
problems when I estimate the vector of parameters  in (6).
When residuals are unit-root stationary, I estimate the short run regressions, using rst dier-
ences of the variables and the lagged error, obtained in the long run equation (6), by mean of the

























19I implement the multivariate Johansen cointegration test on all the variables and I nd that there is only one
cointegration vector; this allows to use the more simple univariate model. I regress bond spreads on CDS because
CDS slightly dominate price discovery, as shown in paragraph 5.1. and gives to the model a better t.
18Again, I apply the analysis on CDS and bond spreads averages for the four rating groups: AA, A
and BBB industrials and AA nancial. I use dummies for the two periods: (i) the period before
the crisis that goes from January 2005 to end of July 2007, (ii) and the period during the crisis
that goes from the beginning of August 2007 to April 2009.
Table 8 reports results for the long run regressions (6). In the analysis, I use interaction
variables, to control for joint eects between independent variables with respect to the dependent
variable. Adjusted R-squared are reported on the bottom of table.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
During the crisis the relation between bond spreads and CDS is generally not signicant, while
it becomes signicant and it is positive during the crisis, as expected, given they are proxy for the
risk of default of the underlying entites. Apparently CDS and bond spreads move in an unrelated
way before the crisis; this is due to the fact that the basis is small, i.e. the parity approximately
holds, but there is little variation, hence arbitrage forces do not enter into play to bring the credit
spreads back to their equilibrium relation: they move within the arbitrage bounds determined for
example by bid-ask spreads and transaction costs.20 Moreover, the relevant economic variables,
namely the Libor-OIS spread, the OIS-Tbill spread, the VIX and the bid-ask spread on CDS are
all signicant, only in the period during the crisis, with the expected sign.
The Libor-OIS spread, the CDS bid-ask and the VIX spread drive the bond spread larger,
hence the basis more negative as expected. The bid-ask spread on CDS is a proxy for liquidity.
Liquidity in the bond and in the CDS market are generally positively cross-correlated. The VIX
captures the deterioration of the value of the bond as a collateral. The cost of funding a negative
basis trade depends on the hair cut applied on the repo-transaction through which the bond is
nanced. Excessive volatility in nancial markets has an adverse impact on the value of the bond
as a collateral and contributes to and increase of haircuts. Along this lines the VIX has the highest
impact (coe 2.4) on the basis for the AA nancials which is the most risky group and it has
20Also the structural break is modeled accounting for the change of the mean of the variables, not for the change
of the variance. High variance, of the variables, in the crisis period lowers the signicance of the cointegrating vector
in the period before the crisis where the variance is low. The focus of the study is on the behavior of the spreads
during the crisis.
19the lowest impact (coe 0.6) on the basis AA industrials which is the most creditworthy group.
The OIS-Tbill spread makes an exception. In two cases, for AA nancials and BBB industrials,
which are the more risky rating groups in the analysis, it has an unexpected negative sign, for
A industrial it is not signicant while for AA industrials it has a positive sign. This variable is
expected to capture the "
ight to quality" eect driving bond spreads larger, but it turns out
not to be the case for all rating groups. The economic impact of these variables is the highest
for bond spreads of the nancial sector, which has been the one at the core of the crisis. Also
the constants are generally signicant during the crisis, meaning that non-transient unobservable
factors in
uencing the relation between bond spread and CDS have come into play .
Notice that interaction variables are signicant, relevant and has homogeneous signs across
rating groups. The Libor-OIS*VIX variable has a negative sign meaning that when the Libor-OIS
spread and the VIX increase jointly their total eect on spreads is slightly lower than the sum of
the two respective parameters. Dierently the OIS-Tbill*VIX variable has a positive sign meaning
that when the OIS-Tbill spread and the VIX increase jointly their total eect on spreads is slightly
higher than the sum of the two respective parameters. Most importantly these interaction variables
act as controls for our relevant economic variables. All the other interaction variables have been
tried, but they turned out to be irrelevant.
The ADF test statistic, reported on the bottom of Table 8, rejects the null hypothesis of a
unit root in the residuals of the long run regression, therefore I estimate the short run regressions
using the Error Correction Model Specication. Results are reported in table 9. For brevity of
exposition, in the table, I show only those variables that are signicant21. Adjusted R-squared are
reported on the bottom of table.
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE
As for the long run regression, also in the short run regression, the relevant economic variables
tend to be signicant, with expected signs, during the crisis period, moreover the signs of the
estimated parameters are generally consistent across the long and short run regressions. The error
21Having 8 variable with 2 dummies and approximately 4 lags each, in the ECM estimation, the table would be
to big.
20correction terms are signicant with a negative sign, meaning that whenever bond spreads are
larger than CDS spreads they tend to revert to the long run equilibrium. This result is in line
with the results of paragraph 5. Further, as expected bond spread changes are positively related
to CDS changes to lagged bond spread changes, to Libor-OIS spread changes, to VIX changes and
to bid-ask spread changes. For AA nancial and BBB industrials, for which the OIS-Tbill variable
has a negative impact in the long run regression, but also for AA industrials it has again a negative
impact in the short run regression.
Graphs 5 and 6, report the actual-tted and residuals and show that the estimated model ts
the data quite well. The adjusted R-squared is on average 0.98 for the long run regression and
around 0.65 for the short run regression.
INSERT FIGURES 5 AND 6 HERE
5.3 Interpretation of the results
Since the beginning of the crisis, in July 2007, the perceived credit risk in the economy has
increased al well as the risk of default on interbank loans.
First, because of the general increase of default risk in the economy, CDS dealers (which are
nancial institutions such as banks, insurance companies or hedge funds) are paying higher funding
rates. This eect is captured by the evolution of the Libor-OIS spread. A dramatic increase of cost
of nancing has aected dealers' CDS pricing as explained in section 3.2.22 The cost of nancing
aects investors trading activities in a similar way. In order to exploit a negative basis an investor
must nance the purchase of the bond and buy protection. During the crisis the cost of nancing,
if indeed nancing is available, has increased substantially thus reducing or eliminating the return
to arbitrageurs. Also, because of the high market volatility, measured by mean of the VIX, margin
requirements (i.e. haircuts) for purchasing risky bonds (via repo transactions) have dramatically
increased (deterioration of funding liquidity); this has reduced the protability and the possibility,
22The lower bound on a dealers bid price for protection is provided by the net cost of nancing the purchase
of the underlying cash bond. In normal conditions this cost approximates the bond spread and, in turn, the CDS
spread. However, when the cost of nancing increases the net cost falls and with it the CDS spread below which
it is worthwhile for the dealer to bid for protection while hedging in the cash market. Lowering the bid price for
protection also lowers the mid-price and, therefore, standard measures of the basis.
21for investors, to implement basis trade, and explains the cross-sectional dierence in the basis
across ratings, i.e. lower rated bonds and nancials exhibit the most negative basis. It turns out
that funding liquidity constraints provide a source of commonality (Acharya and Pedersen 2005)
in explaining bond prices and returns, hence also the basis dynamics.
Second, liquidity has migrated from corporate bond market to the Treasury bond market,
driving risky bond yields larger. This "
ight to quality" eect is captured jointly by the evolution
of the OIS-Tbill spread and by the sharp increase of the VIX and CDS's bid-asks spread.
Third, being CDS contracts an unfunded way of selling protection23, counterparty risk has
contributed driving bond spreads larger than CDS spreads. In fact, during the crisis protection
sellers (dealers which are mostly big banks) have higher default correlation to the assets being
protected. Default risk in the inter-bank lending market is captured, not only by the dynamics of
the CDS on banks, but also by the evolution of the Libor-OIS spread. This risk is priced into CDS
contracts of both nancials and industrials driving their spreads lower irrespective of the actual
default intensity (discount).
Overall, results support the evidence that during the crisis the negative basis trade is largely
exposed to risk factors such as funding liquidity risk and counter-party risk, i.e. it is not risk-free.
The size of the basis is the return asked by investors on negative basis trades, hence it is a premium
due to exposure to systematic risk factors not an idiosyncratic arbitrage opportunity.
5.4 Robustness checks
The analysis reported above has been implemented also on single entities and results are simi-
lar to those obtained on averages of credit spreads within rating groups. Investors carry out basis
trades on single entities, but common risk factors aects bases with similar underlying risks in the
a similar way. Also, results using daily data are similar to those obtained on weekly data. Bond
and CDS prices refers to mid-quotes not to real transactions. The focus of the paper is on the sys-
tematic factors which drive discrepancies between CDS and bond spreads. Quotes are well-behaved
averages of transaction prices and are cleaned from the noise due to idiosyncratic factors.
23While, bond being cash instruments, buying a corporate bond is a funded way of selling protection, hence
counterparty risk is not an issue. But the issue is the cost of nancing the purchase of the bond itself.
22Univariate analysis of the credit spreads time-series shows the presence of conditional hete-
orskedasticity (ARCH and GARCH Engle (1982)). For this reason I implement a cointegration test
that is robust to GARCH eects. I study the dynamic relationship between CDS and bond spreads
by the mean of a Vector Auto Regression, with the introduction of a tractable multivariate GARCH
formulation, such as the "BEKK", proposed by Engel and Kroner (1995). Results show that the
incorporation of the GARCH part allows to conclude more clearly that cointegration exists. The
presence of heteroskedasticity makes it more dicult to reject the null of no cointegration, but
since cointegration between CDS and bond spreads is found anyway, even without controlling for
GARCH eects, I do not implement this methodology in the analysis proposed in the paper.
The choice of the specication of the model in (section 5.2), has been for the univariate ECM,
which allows to easily account for the structural break by mean of period dummy variables. I run
the multivariate Johansen cointegration test on all the economic variables variables of equation (6)
jointly and I nd that there is only one cointegration vector; this allows to use the univariate model.
The reason why I regress bond spreads on CDS is because CDS slightly dominate price discovery,
as shown in paragraph 5.1. and gives to the model a better t. The analysis has also been carried
out estimating separately, for the pre-crisis and the crisis period with, the multivariate VECM and
gives results that are in line with those obtained using the univariate framework.
The structural break of August 2007 is modeled exogenously, because there is a general con-
sensus on the timing of the start of the 2007/08 nancial crisis. One could think of modeling
the structural break by mean of a switching regime model, but in the sample period under study
(2006-2009), there is clear evidence of two states and there is no evidence of a switch between good
and bad states of the credit market conditions; it would be interesting to apply switching regime
models on credit spreads on longer samples which contain more crisis periods.
236 Conclusion
This paper documents that during the crisis, from July 2007 on, there are relevant price dis-
crepancies in the markets for credit risk: the basis is persistently negative, meaning that it would
be cheaper to take credit risk in the cash market, which has been quite infrequent in the past. In
principle, in such a situation, arbitrageurs could buy risky bonds hedge against default risk and
earn more that the risk free rate. Results show that during the crisis the negative basis trade is
largely exposed to risk factors such as funding liquidity risk and counter-party risk, i.e. it is not
risk-free. The size of the basis is the return asked by investors on negative basis trades, hence it is
a premium due to exposure to systematic risk factors not an idiosyncratic arbitrage opportunity.
Variables that capture the cost and risk factors of implementing the negative basis trade, such
as the Libor-OIS spread, the OIS-Tbill spread, the VIX and the bid-ask spread on CDS contracts,
are the main drivers of the basis dynamics in the period during the crisis. The Libor-OIS spread
captures all together (i) the funding cost and the funding liquidity risk faced by investors, (ii)
counter-party risk implicit into CDS spreads and (iii) corporate bond market liquidity deterioration
(Brunnermeier 2009). The OIS-Tbill spread is a measure of the "Flight to quality" phenomenon.
The VIX is a measure of liquidity and risk premia in nancial markets, but most importantly it
explains the bond value deterioration as a collateral. Finally, the bid-ask spread on CDS contracts
is a measure of general liquidity conditions in credit markets.
Results support the evidence that during stress times asset prices depart form frictionless ideals
due to funding liquidity risk faced by nancial intermediaries and investors; hence, deviations from
parity do not imply presence of arbitrage opportunities. Funding liquidity constraints provide a
source of commonality (Acharya and Pedersen 2005) in explaining bond prices and returns, hence
also the basis dynamics.
24References
Acharya, Viral V. Pedersen, Lasse Heje, 2005. Asset pricing with liquidity risk, Journal of Financial
Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2)
Alexakis, Apergis, 1996. ARCH Eects and Cointegraiton: Is the foreign exchange market ecient?
Journal of Banking and Finance.
Brenner R.J., Kroner K.F., 1995. Arbitrage, cointegration, and testing the unbiasedness hypothesis
in nancial markets. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
Brunnremeier, M. K. Deciphering the 2007-08. Liquidity and Credit Crunch', 2009. Journal of
Economic Perspectives.
Collin-Dufresene P, Goldstein S., Spencer Martin J., 2001. The determinants of credit spread
changes. The Journal of Finance.
Garleanu N., Pedersen L, H., 2009. Margin based asset pricing and deviations from the law of one
price. Working paper.
Due, Darrel,1999. Credit Swap valuation, Financial Analyst Journal 55.
Elton E.J., Gruber M.J., Agrawal D., Mann C., 2001. Explaining the rate spread on corporate
bonds. The Journal of Finance.
Engle, Rober F. and Clive W.J. Granger 1987. Cointegration and error correction representation,
estimation and testing. Econometrica 55.
Gonzalo, Jesus, and Clive W.J. Granger 1995. Estimation of common long-memory components in
cointegrated systems. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 13.
Houweling, P and T. Vorst, 2003. Pricing default swaps: empirical evidence. Working paper.
Hull, John C., and Alan White, 2000a. Valuing credit default swaps: No counterparty default risk.
Journal of derivatives 8.
Jan De Wit, 2006. Exploring the CDS-bond basis. National Bank of Belgium, Working paper n.
104
Longsta, Mithal, Neis, 2005. Corporate yield spreads: default risk or liquidity? New evidence
from the credit default swap market. Journal of Finance 5.
Lucy F. Ackert, M.D. Racine,1999. Stochastic trends and Cointegration in the market for equities.
Journal of Economics and business. 51.
Norden Weber, 2004. The co-movement of CDS, bond and stock markets: an empirical anlaysis.
CFS working paper.
Roberto Blanco, Simon Brennan Ian Marsh, 2005. An empirical analysis of the dynamic relation
between investment grade bonds and Credit Default Swaps, Journal of Finance 5.
Robin J. Brenner, Kenneth F. Kroner, 1995. Arbitrage, cointegration, and testing the unbiasedness
hypothesis in nancial markets. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Vol 30.
25Tae-Hwy Lee, Yiuman Tse, 1996 Cointegration test with conditional heteroskedasticity. Journal of
Econometrics.
Zhu, 2004. An empirical comparison of credit spreads between the bond market and the credit
default swp market. BIS working paper.
26Table 1: List of the 37 reference entities. The ratings are from S&P at 8/1/2008.
Entity Code Sector S&P Ratings
JpMorgan Chase JPM Financial AAA
Citigroup Inc CIT Financial AA
Morgan Stanley MST Financial AA
Wachovia Corp WAC Financial AA
Merrill Lynch MLY Financial A
Textron TXT Manifacturing A
Caterpillar CAT Manifacturing A
Deere DEE Manifacturing A
Emerson Electric EMR Manifacturing A
United Technologies UNT Manifacturing A
Tyco International TYC Manifacturing BBB
Procter&Gamble PRG Consumer AA
Colgate Palmolive CLG Consumer AA
Avon protucts AVN Consumer A
Whirlpool Corp WRP Consumer BBB
Mattel Inc MTT Consumer BBB
Newell Rubbermaid NLL Consumer BBB
Waste Mgmt Inc WST Consumer BBB
PPG Industries PPG Chemicals A
Air Products AIR Chemicals A
Dow Chemical DOW Chemicals BBB
Lubrizol LBZ Chemicals BBB
Hess HSS Petr&Gas BBB
Sunoco SUN Petr&Gas BBB
Valero VAL Petr&Gas BBB
Archer-Daniels ARC Food&Beverage A
Kraft KFT Food&Beverage A
Coca Cola Co CCL Food&Beverage A
General Mills GML Food&Beverage BBB
ConAgra CAG Food&Beverage BBB
Anheuser-Bush Cos ANH Food&Beverage BBB
AT&T/SBC SBC Telecomunications A
BellSouth BEL Telecomunications A
Johnson&Johnson J&J Pharma AAA
Pzer PFZ Pharma AAA
Abbott ABB Pharma AA
Hospira HOS Pharma BBB
27Table 2: Number of reference entities by rating and by sector.
Sector / Rating AAA AA A BBB Total
Financial - 4 1 - 5
Manifacturing - - 5 1 6
Consumer - 2 1 4 7
Chemicals - - 2 2 4
Petr&Gas - - - 4 4
Food&Beverage - - 3 3 6
Telecomunication 2 - 2
Pharmaceutical 2 1 - 1 4
Total 2 7 14 14 37
Table 3: Average and median basis before and during crisis. This table provides the average
and the median of the CDS-bond basis, dened to be the dierence between the CDS spread and
the bond spread. For each reference entity and expressed in basis points. The bond spread is
calculated as the dierence between the 5-year interpolated yield on the risky bond and the 5-year
swap rate. Sample period is divided into three parts: 1/3/2005 to 7/31/2007 is the period before
crisis (Period 1), 8/1/2007 to 7/31/2008 is the crisis period (Period 2) Lehman and 8/1/2008 to
4/1/2009 (Period 3) is the crisis period after Lehman collapsed. Crossectional mean and median
are provided, for groups of entities according to rating, separately for the nancial and industrial
sector
Average Basis (Median) 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd Period
Industrials
AAA 12.0 0.5 -60.0
(11.1) (0.9) (-77)
AA 7.3 -9.2 -77.1
(8.9) (-8.8) (-88.5)
A -4.9 -25.9 -126.1
(-5.2) (-24.4) (-143)
BBB 3.8 -32.8 -165.8
-4.2 (-32.1) (-206.4)
Financials
AA -7.3 -18.7 -308.4
(-5.5) (-21.2) (-394.4)
Average all 2.2 -17.2 -147.5
28Table 4: ADF unit root tests. Sample period 1/3/2005 - 4/1/2009. Automatic selection of lags
based on SIC: 0 to 14. * Means 1% level rejection based on MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Statistics CDS Bond Spread
ADF - Level
AA Industrials 0.971 0.936
AA Financials 0.977 0.997
A Industrials 0.999 0.982
BBB Industrials 0.996 0.999
ADF - First dierence
AA Industrials 0.000* 0.000*
AA Financials 0.000* 0.000*
A Industrials 0.000* 0.000*
BBB Industrials 0.000* 0.000*
Table 5: Cointegration tests. Sample period 1/3/2005 - 4/1/2009. Unrestricted Cointegration
Rank Test (Trace test). Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level. Automatic
selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 17. * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level.
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values.
Group Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
Industrials AA None * 0.086 19.504 15.892 0.012*
N. lags (4) At most 1 0.005 1.296 9.164 0.908
Financials AA None * 0.134 33.490 20.261 0.000*
N. lags (4) At most 1 0.010 2.209 9.164 0.735
Industrials A None * 0.124 30.717 20.261 0.001*
N. lags (6) At most 1 0.010 2.209 9.164 0.735
Industrials BBB None * 0.122 30.006 20.261 0.001*
N. lags (6) At most 1 0.009 1.975 9.164 0.782
29Table 6: Long-run regressions. Sample period 1/3/2005 - 4/1/2009. This table reports the
estimates of the equation that describes the long run relationship between CDS and bond spreads,
given by CDSt = 0 + 1BSt, for each of the four rating groups. T-statistics in ( )
Industrials AA Financials AA Industrials A Industrials BBB
CDS 1 1 1 1
Bond spread 0.372 0.448 0.498 0.467
(16.407)*** (19.055)*** (28.269)*** (30.479)***
Constant 11.031 16.127 8.292 -23.452
(8.513)*** (2.602)* (4.349)** (11.421)***
30Table 7: Short-run regressions This table reports the estimates of the short run dynamics of
CDS and bond spread changes. Sample period 1/3/2005- 4/1/2009. The measure is based on the
following Vector Error Correction Model regressions:




j=1 1jBSt j + 1t




j=1 2jBSt j + 2t
The nal lines report the "Adjusted R Squared" of each regression and the Granger-Gonzalo
measure, which is a measure of the contribution of the two markets to price discovery and is
dened as: 2
2 1 and is bounded between 0 and 1. T-statistics in ( )
Industrials AA Financials AA
CDS Bond spread CDS Bond spread
CointEq1 -0.076 0.233 -0.084 0.314
(-3.318)** ( 2.697)* (-1.013) ( 3.481)**
D(CDS(-1)) 0.258 1.146 0.174 0.002
( 3.813)** ( 4.536)*** ( 2.087)* ( 0.024)
D(CDS(-2)) 0.061 -0.068 -0.058 0.109
( 0.855) (-0.253) (-0.693) ( 1.207)
D(CDS(-3)) 0.104 -0.735 -0.034 -0.008
( 1.461) (-2.747)* (-0.437) (-0.106)
D(CDS(-4)) 0.026 0.527 -0.171 -0.003
( 0.387) ( 2.046)* (-2.226)* (-0.047)
D(Bond spread(-1)) 0.045 0.262 -0.240 -0.468
( 2.415)* ( 3.750)** (-3.213)* (-5.810)***
D(Bond spread(-2)) 0.009 0.053 0.232 -0.098
( 0.491) ( 0.737) ( 2.898)* (-1.133)
D(Bond spread(-3)) -0.050 0.048 0.280 0.023
(-2.638)* ( 0.676) ( 3.396)** ( 0.263)
D(Bond spread(-4)) 0.012 0.048 -0.308 -0.127
( 0.688) ( 0.692) (-3.709)** (-1.424)
Adj. R-squared 0.210 0.189 0.306 0.212
GG Measure 0.752 0.787
31Industrials A Industrials BBB
CDS Bond spread CDS Bond spread
CointEq1 -0.182 0.272 -0.201 0.151
(-2.642)** ( 4.024)** (-3.648)** 2.539*
D(CDS(-1)) -0.056 0.071 0.141 0.198
(-0.664) ( 0.847) ( 1.804) ( 2.329)**
D(CDS(-2)) 0.125 0.054 0.180 0.118
( 1.563) ( 0.698) ( 2.332*) ( 1.417)
D(CDS(-3)) 0.167 0.032 -0.052 0.341
( 2.135)* (0.418) (-0.675) ( 4.082)**
D(CDS(-4)) 0.181 0.191 -0.124 -0.091
( 2.324)* (2.509)* (-1.520) (-1.031)
D(CDS(-5)) 0.017 0.036 0.145 -0.499
( 0.220) ( 0.477) ( 1.788) (-5.659)***
D(CDS(-5)) 0.114 -0.207 0.338 -0.079
( 1.504) (-2.777)* ( 3.881)** (-0.846)
D(Bond spread(-1)) 0.096 0.263 0.091 0.251
( 1.355) ( 3.748)** ( 1.359) ( 3.452)**
D(Bond spread(-2)) -0.098 0.204 0.072 0.221129
(-1.386) (2.920)* (1.07785) ( 3.049)**
D(Bond spread(-3)) -0.375 0.024 -0.197 -0.058
(-5.412)*** (0.354) (-2.930)** (-0.800)
D(Bond spread(-4)) -0.032 -0.001 -0.081 0.144
(-0.439) (-0.017) (-1.361) ( 2.244)*
D(Bond spread(-5)) 0.131 0.149 0.117 0.200
( 1.814) ( 2.094)* ( 1.927)* ( 3.050)**
D(Bond spread(-6)) 0.242 0.133 0.105 -0.015
( 3.455)** ( 1.929)* ( 1.852) (-0.257)
Adj. R-squared 0.215 0.386 0.241 0.476
GG Measure 0.599 0.429
32Table 8: Long-run regression. Sample period 1/3/2005 - 4/1/2009. P-value in ( )
Bond Spread AA Industrial AA Financials A Industrial BBB Industrial
Dum1 19.339 19.552 57.344 26.103
(0.1253) (0.795) (0.029)** (0.380)
Dum2 -58.506 -251.917 -124.763 -94.378
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Dum1*(CDS) -1.002 -0.436 -0.117 0.264
(0.035)** (0.642) (0.828) 0.383
Dum2*(CDS) 1.000 0.473 0.413 0.969335
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Dum1*Lib-OIS -0.418 -0.333 -3.131 0.760
(0.208) (0.970) (0.294) (0.786)
Dum2*Lib-OIS 0.186 1.280 0.525 0.492
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Dum1*OIS-Tbill -0.075 0.508 -0.212 0.082
(0.838) (0.750) (0.151) (0.913)
Dum2*OIS-Tbill 0.273 -1.336 -0.009 -0.606
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.947) (0.000)***
Dum1*VIX -0.140 0.808 -1.395 -0.054
(0.871) (0.867) (0.380) (0.979)
Dum2*VIX 0.688 2.417 1.557 1.052
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Dum1*Bid-Ask 0.850 4.972 1.225 1.043
(0.414) (0.054)* (0.446) (0.486)
Dum2*Bid-Ask 7.284 44.854 23.806 19.891
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Dum1*Lib-OIS*VIX 0.047 0.036 0.134 -0.035
(-0.667) (0.956) (0.538) (0.863)
Dum2*Lib-OIS*VIX 0.000 -0.012 -0.007 -0.009
(-0.813) (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Dum1*OIS-TBill*VIX 0.007 -0.042 0.013 -0.009
(0.786) (0.706) (-0.801) (0.856)
Dum2*OIS-TBill*VIX -0.013 0.031 -0.006 0.012
(0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.1370) (0.005)***
Adj. R-Squared 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98
ADF Test on resid (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
33Table 9: Short-run regression. Sample period 1/3/2005 - 4/1/2009. P-value in ( )
AA Industrial AA Financials A Industrial BBB Industrial
ECM1(-1) -0.673 - -0.231 -0.259
(0.042)** - (0.044)** (0.058)*
ECM2(-1) -0.368 -0.131 -0.122 /
(0.0003)*** (0.021)** (0.091)** /
Dum2*D(CDS) - 2.243 - 0.260
- (0.017)** - (0.007)***
Dum2*D(CDS(-1)) 0.727 0.282 0.254 0.176
(0.013)** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.058)*
Dum2*D(CDS(-2)) - 0.395 - -
- (0.000)*** - -
Dum2*D(CDS(-3)) - 0.167 - 0.283
- (0.041)** - (0.005)***
Dum2*D(CDS(-4)) 0.822 - 0.248 -
(0.021)** - (0.007)*** -
Dum2*D(Bond spread(-1)) 0.277 -0.152 0.235 -
(0.009)** (0.077)* (0.018)** -
Dum2*D(Bond spread(-3)) - 0.304 - -
- (0.009)** - -
Dum2*D(Bond spread(-4)) - -0.202 - -
- (0.025)** - -
Dum2*D(Lib-OIS(-2)) - 0.655 - -
- (0.009)*** - -
Dum2*D(Lib-OIS(-3)) - - - 0.158
- - - (0.052)*
Dum2*D(Lib-OIS(-4)) - - - 0.161
- - - (0.037)**
Dum2*D(OIS-TBill) - -1.625 - -0.375
- (0.000)*** - (0.000)***
Dum2*D(OIS-TBill(-2)) - - - -0.193
- - - (0.092)*
Dum2*D(OIS-TBill(-3)) -0.180 - - -
(0.0133)** - - -
Dum2*D(OIS-TBill(-4)) - -0.561 - -
- (0.025)** - -
Dum2*D(VIX) - -5.646 - -
- (0.000)*** - -
Dum2*D(VIX(-2)) - 3.288 - -
- (0.000)*** - -
34AA Industrial AA Financials A Industrial BBB Industrial
Dum2*D(Bid-Ask) 2.917 - - -
(0.041)** - - -
Dum2*D(Bid-Ask(-1)) - - 4.255 4.097
- - (0.080)* (0.055)*
Dum2*D(Bid-Ask(-2)) - - -4.674 4.977
- - (0.032)** (0.031)**
Dum2*D(Bid-Ask(-4)) - 14.394 - -
- (0.000)*** - -
Dum2*D(Lib-OIS*VIX) - 0.013 - -0.004
- (0.056)* - (0.038)**
Dum2*D(Lib-OIS(-1)*VIX(-2)) - -0.022 - -
- (0)*** - -
Dum2*D(Lib-OIS(-1)*VIX(-3)) 0.006 0.010 - -
(0.006)*** (0.018)** - -
Dum2*D(Lib-OIS(-1)*VIX(-4)) - - - -0.004
- - - (0.005)***
Dum1*D(VIX(-1)*OIS-TBill) - 0.066 - 0.011
- (0)*** - (0.007)***
Dum2*D(VIX(-2)*OIS-TBill(-2)) - - -0.010 -
- - (0.0337)** -
Dum2*D(VIX(-4)*OIS-TBill(-4)) - 0.026 - -
- (0.003)*** - -
Adj. R-Squared 0.43 0.89 0.51 0.76
35Figure 1: CDS, bond I-spread and basis. This gure shows the time series of the cross-sectional
averages of the CDS, the bond I spreads (5y YTM - 5y swap rate) and the basis (CDS - I spread)
by rating, separately for industrials and nancials. The series are expressed in basis points. Sample
period 1/3/2005 - 4/1/2009.
36Figure 2: Libor-OIS spread and OIS-TBill spread. The Libor-OIS spread is the dierence
between the interest rate on interbank loans (Libor) with a maturity of 3 months and the Overnight
Indexed Swap. The OIS-TBill spread is the dierence between the Overnight Indexed Swap and
short-term U.S. government debt ("T-bills") with a maturity of 3 months.
Figure 3: Time series of the VIX. The VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility
Index. The volatility is implied from options written on the SP500 Stock Index.
37Figure 4: Time series of the bid-ask spread on CDS contracts. The series cross-sectional
time-series for indutrials and nancials and are expressed in basis points.
38Figure 5: Long run regressions estimation.
39Figure 6: Short run regressions estimation.
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